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FROM BLOCKCHAIN TO INTERNET-BASED VOTING 
ELHAM AKBARI 
ABSTRACT 
Blockchain has been one of the hottest topics among the state-of-the-art 
technologies. As the enabling technology for Bitcoin, the pioneering cryptocurrency, 
blockchain is an append-only distributed ledger that is virtually impossible to attack. 
Hence, blockchain holds great promises as the fundamental technology to enable 
Internet-based electronic voting. However, Internet-based voting has additional 
requirements than what monetary transactions such as Bitcoin have to offer. In this thesis, 
we discuss the key differences of a blockchain-based voting system with digital 
currencies. In this context we also highlight the requirements, review existing proposed 
solutions, and outline possible improvements. Specifically, we propose several schemes 
on how to tackle various issues such as authentication, privacy, transparency, scalability, 
safety, as well as several other practical aspects of the platform. Most importantly, a 
blockchain-based voting system needs to ensure that the prospect of tampering with the 
election result is to a large extent eliminated. At the same time, the voting platform 
should have proper performance characteristics, i.e. sufficient throughput, for a voting of 
large magnitude such as a presidential election. Being heavily linked together, security 
and performance should be investigated in a unified framework to capture the interaction 
effects between the two. To address this concern, for the first time, we will study the 
performance and security implications of the blockchain voting system in a quantitative 
manner, using a blockchain simulator developed by researchers at Swiss Federal Institute 
of Technology, ETH Zurich. In our analysis, we will specifically investigate the stale 
vi 
 
block rate and relative mining share of the dishonest network, as the central security 
measures, as a function of important network parameters that determine the throughput of 
the network, i.e. block size and block interval. Ultimately, we focus on selfish mining and 
eclipse attacks as the most critical threats to the integrity of the blockchain voting in 
order to find the optimal network parameters. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
The voting systems that have been utilized globally to permit people cast their 
ballots are either paper-based (conventional) or electronic-based. Not only using paper 
ballots and counting them is prone to errors but also is a time-consuming process. 
However, the risks of the electronic voting (e-voting) is so substantial that has prevented 
many governments from implementing it. If any interference with an e-voting system 
happens, the possible costs are beyond fatal. All in all, the existing voting systems, 
whether they are electronic or conventional, involve insufficient levels of transparency. 
In effect, in either case it becomes extremely difficult or unbearable for voters to ensure 
that their election votes are counted carefully and accurately by the election 
administrators. As an example, the Virginia’s voting machine displayed different 
security-related problems causing complete discontinuation of it by the Virginia 
Information Technologies Agency. Moreover, Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Voting 
Systems such as those implemented in Brazilian election do not publicly provide any 
records of the election statistics and results, apart from the counts of the votes. This 
implies that only government representatives are capable of recounting the votes if 
required. This by no means can provide the voters with any confidence in the election 
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results. Although, in some cases the information from a Direct Recording Electronic 
System can be backtracked to explore association of votes with voters, it would generate 
serious concerns about the votes confidentiality which is not acceptable in a democratic 
election.  
 
Figure 1-1 The schematic of a blockchain network. 
The transparency, assurance, and confidentiality issues of an e-voting system can 
now be potentially addressed using a new and emerging technology that is called 
blockchain. With its exclusive features and characteristics, the Blockchain technology 
possesses very promising potentials. Figure 1, for instance, illustrates the schematic of 
how a typical blockchain system operates to achieve a safe and secure transaction without 
the need for any financial institution. When person “A” owes person “B” money for a 
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service, B requests a transaction from the wallet of A. The transaction is then represented 
in the network as a “Block”. The block is then broadcast to every “node” in the network. 
These nodes are normally called “miners”. Once the block is approved by the majority of 
the miners, the transaction can be finally approved and completed. This provides a 
transparent and reliable platform for sending and receiving transactions, completely 
different than conventional methods relying on financial institutions. The same concept 
can be also extended to other transaction-like notions such as votes.  
In 2008, blockchain was first introduced by an unknown person named Satoshi 
Nakamoto (a pseudonym), who intended to develop a peer-to-peer payment system 
allowing money transactions through the web without relying on trust or the need for a 
financial bank. In 2016, an Australian computer scientist and businessman named “Craig 
Steven Wright” publicly claimed to be the main part of the team that was responsible for 
inventing the blockchain. A blockchain system is in principle, an open source system, yet 
resistant to any data modifications. 
The unique and secure architecture of a blockchain-based network infers that 
interfering is fundamentally impossible when properly executed, because a blockchain 
network is stringently transparent and consensus-based as well as distributed. After the 
2016 US presidential elections in which the electronic voting systems were regarded to 
be interfered with by foreign hackers, the implementation of voting with the aid of 
blockchain networks has gained increasingly higher attention. For instance, President 
Obama’s decision to deprive 35 Russian diplomats from the US due to the concerns of 
Russia’s interference with the 2016 election, deduces the vulnerability of the voting 
systems to external tampering. A voting system that is equipped with blockchain 
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technology provides a substantial level of transparency by sustaining an exposed registry 
of votes, while defending the privacy of the voters. In blockchain technology, consensus 
from almost all the nodes is mandatory in order for a transaction to gets approved. This 
makes the voting machine a substantially safer platform. In other words, in order to tinker 
the election result, an attacker must be able to get access to a significant portion of all the 
nodes within the network. When a sufficiently large number of nodes are implemented, 
potential attacks become exponentially more challenging to conduct, if not fully 
impossible. In the following we aim at reviewing the previous works that have been 
performed on blockchain-based e-voting systems. 
In 2015, Daniel for the first time proposed the use of blockchain technology as a 
key to secure online voting [1]. In 2016, however, the notion of using blockchain-based 
e-voting systems gained more traction during the US presidential election. In particular, 
this followed after September 2016, when FBI Director testified before the House 
Judiciary Committee that the FBI was investigating Russian hackers attempting to disrupt 
the 2016 election and that federal investigators had detected hacker-related activities 
in state voter registration databases, confirming there were multiple attempts to hack 
voter database registrations [2]. In late 2016, Ryan Osgood [3] discussed the engineering 
of the blockchain and its benefits as well as the progress and challenges of widespread 
adoption. In early 2017, Kartik Hegadekatti [4] outlined the procedure underlining voting 
on the blockchain and reviewed the advantages of such system. He also analyzed the 
impacts of voting through the Blockchain. In January 2017, Ivo Kubjas [5] described how 
to make internet voting protocols more secure through the use of blockchain. In May 
2017, Ahmed Ben Ayed [6] proposed an electronic voting system design by leveraging 
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the open source nature of the blockchain technology for making elections secure, reliable, 
and anonymous, and to help increase the number of voters as well as the trust of people in 
their governments. In 2017, Moura and Gomes [7] explored the possibility of using 
blockchain technology to help solve transparency and confidence issues associated with 
nation-wide elections. They focused on the societal problems and their respective 
analysis. Finally they analyzed how the adoption of Blockchain into a digital government 
repertoire can contribute to common e-voting issues and also promote elections 
transparency, increase auditability, and strengthen democracy. In June 2017, Bartolucci el 
al. [8] discussed possible uses of the blockchain technology for implementing a secure 
and fair voting system. They introduced a secret share-based voting system on the 
blockchain, the so-called SHARVOT protocol. The solution they provided used Shamir’s 
Secret Sharing to enable on-chain, i.e. within the transactions script, votes submission 
and winning candidate determination. Their proposed protocol also used a shuffling 
technique, Circle Shuffle, to de-link voters from their submissions. In 2017, Kaan Koç et 
al. [9] implemented and tested a sample e-voting application as a smart contract for the 
Ethereum network using the Ethereum wallets and the Solidity language. They 
considered Android platform to allow voting for people who do not have Ethereum 
wallets. In their proposed approach, once an election is completed the Ethereum 
blockchain will maintain the records of ballots and votes. Users can then submit their 
votes via an Android device or directly from their Ethereum wallets, and these transaction 
requests are handled with the consensus of all Ethereum node. This can potentially create 
a transparent environment for e-voting. In 2018, Casado-Vara and Corchado [10] 
proposed a new model of Blockchain, designated to prevent and minimize the flaws of 
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the voting system. In the proposed model, the Distributed Ledger (Blockchain) is used to 
broadcast digital, smart contract voting to a poll station. Then the poll station sends a 
smart contract to individual voters and registers the vote on a sidechain. At the end of the 
voting process, the entire sidechain would be committed to the main voting Blockchain. 
Smart contracts would be used as a platform to vote, with the reason being to prevent 
malicious activities. At the end of the voting, the poll station applies a multi-signature to 
the most recent vote of each voter, and smart contract transfers it to the candidate or 
ballot measure. In 2018, Wang et al. [11] proposed an electronic voting scheme based on 
blockchain based on the homomorphic ElGamal encryption and ring signature. The key 
properties of such system is reported to be decentralization, self-management, 
non-interactive, and free-receipt. Moreover, the one-time ring signature ensures the 
anonymity of the vote trading in the distributed ledger. Furthermore, the public verifiable 
billboards is claimed to guarantee the voting fairness, while the miner nodes that provide 
ciphertext ballot counting service make large-scale voting feasible. In 2018, Akbari and 
Zhao et al. [12] analyzed additional requirements of Internet-based voting compared to 
monetary transactions. They also review existing proposed solutions, and outlined 
possible improvements. They also proposed to use live biometrics of the voter to perform 
secure and highly reliable remote authentication. Additionally, a scheme was suggested 
to protect the secrecy of the ballots while eliminating the influence of the-already-cast 
votes on the ongoing election process. Finally, they proposed to impose a hierarchy to the 
voting infrastructure that aligns naturally with traditional voting. This enables parallel 
processing of multiple blockchains, to overcome the intrinsic scalability limitation of the 
blockchain technology. Despite numerous publications and studies performed on the 
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applicability of blockchain for electronic-based elections, the feasibility of such platform 
especially at large-scale is yet to be fully explored. Furthermore, the security 
requirements of the blockchain-based voting systems have not received much attention in 
the literature. In this thesis, for the first time, we propose using Proof of Work (PoW) as 
the consensus mechanism for internet-based blockchain voting systems to investigate the 
security guarantees of variant or forked PoW platforms. In particular, we will implement 
a quantitative framework to analyze the security and performance implications of a 
PoW-based blockchain-voting system. Based on such framework, we will take into 
account real-world constraints such as network propagation, block generation intervals, 
different block sizes, information propagation mechanism, etc. This framework will 
allow us to quantitatively compare the tradeoffs between the performance and security 
provisions of various PoW-based deployments. In this regard, we will exploit a 
blockchain simulator developed at ETH Zurich [13] to evaluate different 
blockchain-voting instances from a performance standpoint. 
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CHAPTER II  
INTRODUCTION TO BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY 
In this chapter we give an overview of how the blockchain works by using Bitcoin 
as an example. We also describe the most important concepts behind the operation of 
blockchain systems.  
2.1 What is Blockchain? 
A blockchain, in brief, is a certain type of data structure which controls how data 
is constructed and stored. Databases, images, CSV and text files are other conventional 
types of data structures. In other words, a Blockchain or distributed ledger technology 
(DLT) is a protocol that enables information to be traded between different involved 
parties within a network without the need for intermediaries. This enables specific events 
to be agreed upon by parties without the need for a third party. In this context, no single 
entity owns or controls the data.  Moreover, the database should be append-only. i.e. 
information can only be written to them and old information cannot be modified or 
deleted unless based on a complete agreement from the entire network of users. In the 
event that someone decides to rewrite a portion of the ledger, it will take them an 
enormous amount of time to catch up and overtake the remainder of the network which is 
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legit for the most part. For this very reason blockchains are known to be extremely 
difficult to alter. 
In a blockchain, the network users anonymously interact with each other via 
encrypted identities. In effect, each virtual asset is added to an undisputable transaction 
chain and distributed to all network nodes [14]. This is a unique characteristic of 
peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. P2P computing or networking is a distributed application 
architecture that divides responsibilities and functions between peers (Fig. 2.1). In P2P 
networks, peers are equally privileged to take part in the application. This is unlike 
server-based networks in which data is completely kept on servers, and one can access 
the data upon logging in. Majority of the internet is server-based. For instance, websites 
are held on the server, and clients are those who access it. In server-based networks the 
clients entrust the data to be definitive. Although, this traditional model is very efficient 
in computing, it is a centralized network and therefore vulnerable to attacks or failures.  
    
      (a)      (b) 
Figure 2-1. (a) Schematic of a centralized (server-based) network. (b) Schematic 
of a decentralized (peer-to-peer) network 
A P2P network is similar to a gossip network in which every peer has access to 
almost all the data, and updates are shared between the peers. Since the data in a P2P 
network is duplicated many times, it is typically considered less efficient than 
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server-based networks. Even though each duplication or modification of the data 
introduces too much gossip around the network, each peer is more independent, and can 
continue operating partially even if they lose connection with the network. Furthermore, 
since no central server controls the data in P2P networks, they are in general more robust, 
i.e. attacking peer-to-peer networks is significantly more challenging. 
2.1.1 History and Applications 
Bitcoin is the first widely used application of the blockchain technology. Today, 
Bitcoin is known worldwide as the first decentralized digital currency, and 
cryptography-based payment system. It can be simply described as a vast database of 
transactions that relies on operation of tens of thousands of computing machines around 
the globe. Bitcoin enables transactions that can take place directly between users. 
Verification of such transactions is performed through a large network of nodes called 
miners. These transactions are recorded in a public distributed ledger we know as 
blockchain. Individual duplicates of such are stored in the network using the universal 
bitcoin protocol. A series of files known as “blocks” are used to keep the record of every 
single transaction that has ever occurred in the system. This is in fact called the Bitcoin 
ledger that has been constantly growing ever since it was introduced in January 2009. 
The schematic of a typical blockchain system, and Bitcoin for that matter, is shown in 
Fig. 2.2. 
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Figure 2-2. The structure of a blockchain system. 
The Bitcoin ledger is an open source database in which one does not need 
permission from anyone in order to write stuff into it. As a result, no logging in or 
signing up is needed for the users in order to have access to it. The act of appending is 
done through running an open-source software through which one computer connects to 
the other computers within the network via web. The software allows one to send or 
receive transactions, or add data to the ledger by solving a computationally difficult math 
problem that is yet easily verifiable. This is widely known as “mining”. It is important to 
note that, the math problems are made challenging using functions called “hash”. In 
the bitcoin protocol, the hash functions are part of the cryptography algorithm that is used 
to write new transactions into the system through the mining process. Mining is an vital 
and essential part of blockchain that guarantees fairness while keeping the network stable 
and secure. Miners are issued a certain number of bitcoins in exchange for their service. 
This creates an incentivized platform to attract more people to mine. The higher the 
number of miners, a larger and more secure network can be created. By reviewing a 
Bitcoin file, one may easily find out which account has how many Bitcoins and which 
account is receiving Bitcoin from whom. This level of transparency is what enables the 
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Bitcoin transactions verifiable by anyone anywhere in the world. As a result, in case 
someone tries to append a fraudulent transaction the miners would easily know and do 
not approve it. 
To date, thousands of different public and private blockchains are running through 
the network, many of which are yet to gain substantial traction. They can be divided into 
four main groups listed in Fig. 2.3. Based on these categories, a blockchain-based 
e-voting system would fall under “Record-keeping” platforms. 
 
Figure 2-3. Applications of the blockchain technology can be divided into four 
main categories. 
2.1.2 Public vs Private Blockchains 
Depending on the blockchain technology needed for a certain purpose, we may 
allow anyone to write data into the ledger or only grant permission to a certain group of 
trustees, i.e. vetted contributors, to do so. A blockchain can be public from two different 
aspects, giving permission for writing data and for reading data. When it comes to public 
blockchains, typically the former is intended. On the contrary, in a private blockchain all 
Blockchain
Smart 
Contracts
Security
Digital 
Currency
Record 
Keeping
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the participants are know and trusted. One of the drawbacks of a public blockchain is that 
it may be vulnerable to potential systematic attacks. When a sufficiently large group of 
hackers aim at intruding into a network they can outnumber the legitimate miners and 
compromise the consensus mechanism (described in the following section) in a certain 
direction. In the case of a digital currency such as Bitcoin, this may not introduce a great 
deal of concern, but it definitely will for certain record keeping projects such as that of a 
national election. In case of the latter, a foreign government might have both the power 
and interest into intervening in the election result in favor of a particular party, as was 
explained in Chapter 1. This problem can be addressed by a private blockchain in which, 
a set of trusted entities can have the permission to write, but read-access is granted to 
everyone. One question arising here is that what is the difference between a private 
blockchain and conventional third party platforms? Blockchains can eliminate the need 
for data transfer from organizations to the third party and vice versa. As a substitute, data 
is transferred between known organizations and a consensus can be made within a small 
interval. This infers that all parties can operate from a single and known state of events. 
Encryption is used to maintain privacy of information while digital signatures ensure 
authenticity and integrity of date. In other words, blockchains can address the problem of 
demanding trusted third parties [15]. 
2.2 Consensus 
 “Consensus” is the problem of getting members of a ledger to agree upon some 
entity. In centralized networks, there exists a control unit that can agree on the correct 
entities and send them to the entire network. In a distributed ledger, however, nodes in 
14 
 
the network needs to cooperatively come up with an agreement without benefiting a 
centralized unit. Being further complicated, some nodes within the network may attempt 
to compromise the integrity of the system by supporting a consensus that favors 
themselves rather than backing the actual truth. In other words, the consensus mechanism 
in a blockchain helps line up all the nodes in the system to develop an identical view of 
any event. Consensus-based blockchains are empowered by the ability to eliminate third 
parties from the ledger, while still having participants who agree on true and legitimate 
events. The question arising here is how an agreement can be reached in a general 
distributed ledger, or how the data to be written on the network can be selected? 
Moreover, it is imperative to develop a mechanism that can help find a resolution when 
different nodes claim contradictory things, and no mediation can be sought. 
The answer actually lies in the concept of protocols that operate based on 
pre-settled guidelines for standardizing the consensus mechanism. In a P2P network even 
if the entire group of peers are trustworthy, the problem of agreement or consensus can 
still arise. In such scenarios, the network should be able to determine the state of the data, 
even if peers provide updates at different speeds and/or have somewhat different states. A 
typical issue known as “fork” occurs in distributed ledgers when several blocks are 
concurrently added via different miners. This can happen because blocks take time to be 
shared across the network. This is not unique to monetary blockchains and can also 
happen to blockchain voting. Hence, it is important to decide which one should count as 
the legit block. In such cases, a consensus rule called “longest chain” can help distinguish 
the legitimate block from fraudulent blocks. When a miner elects to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of an existing path, the path will be extended and it is inferred as a vote 
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towards consensus on that particular path. This implies that the longer a path is, the more 
computation has been performed to build it. As an example, let’s consider the schematic 
of Fig. 2.4 and assume that all the miners are synchronized on block 51. Now, if three 
miners generate three different “Block 52” at almost the same time, the longest chain rule 
will be used to decide which block is valid. It should be noted that the three different 
blocks are slightly different because they contain different payment addresses and 
different set of transactions. In practice, one may assume that the first block 52 they see, 
in this case block 52 (a), is valid and start making the next block based on that going after 
a possible block 53 (a). However, in seconds later a block 52 (b) can appear as well, 
followed by block 53 (b), instead. In such case, based on the longest chain rule, 
block 52 (a) should be ignored and extension (b) should be regarded as valid. 
 
Figure 2-4. The schematic of a blockchain tree; the longest path represents the 
accepted chain.  
2.3 Principle of Operation 
In this section, Bitcoin is used as an example to describe how blockchain 
operates. With bitcoin, literally anyone can download the “Bitcoin Core” software and 
start authenticating transactions as well as generating blocks. The computer that runs the 
Bitcoin software as a full node can connect to the Bitcoin network, download and store 
Block 50 Block 51
Block 52 (a)
Block 52 (b) Block 53 (b) Block 54 (b)
Block 52 (c)
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the ledger, monitor and validate transactions and blocks, create and mine the blocks. With 
Bitcoin, no sign up or log in is required for joining the network. This is completely unlike 
a centralized network such as SWIFT in which one must first get granted the permission 
to download the software and start monitoring the transactions. A potential issue with 
public blockchain systems is that they can be potentially attacked by anyone. As a result, 
a certain mechanism is needed is such systems to make the entire network trustworthy 
even though some of the users do not act that way. Hypothetically, a potential dishonest 
actor can (a) decline valid transactions that are sent to other players in the network, (b) 
try generating blocks that are to his/her own interest, (c) conduct double-spending 
activities, (d) try to generate “longer chains” of select blocks to transform a pre-accepted 
block into an orphan block. However, they cannot (a) generate Bitcoins out of nowhere, 
thieve Bitcoins from someone else’s account, and (c) make payments on someone else’s 
behalf. Despite all that, the impact a fraudulent node might have is often times very 
restricted. As long as the majority of the network are trustworthy, they will discard any 
deceitful transactions originating from dishonest nodes. They will also hear the valid 
transactions from honest actors, regardless. If a dishonest node has enough block 
generation power, they can only delay valid transactions by declining to include them 
into their blocks. Nevertheless, the valid transactions will be still known by the honest 
miners as “unconfirmed transaction” and therefore will be included in their blocks. In the 
worst case scenario, if the dishonest node can generate a longer chain of blocks compared 
to the rest of the nodes to instance the “longest chain rule” and outnumber the honest 
chains, a transaction can be undone. 
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In reality however, double-spending can be made extremely difficult to execute in 
blockchain networks. In Bitcoin, for instance, adding blocks is only possible at the 
expense of solving extremely difficult computational problems. This would be very 
expensive for the hacker to conduct because solving such problems requires a large 
extent of processing power that is only feasible upon buying and maintaining a very large 
number of computers.  
This computational process can be defined as a guessing game in which the 
miners need to speculate a number that can results in a “hash” when processed alongside 
the rest of the block data contents. Hash can be described as some sort of password or 
fingerprint that is associated with the level of difficulty of mining or the total network 
processing power and needs to be smaller than a certain number. The more computers 
join the block processing task the more difficult it becomes to solve. This occurs in a 
self-regulating fashion. Such guessing game is known as “Proof of work” or PoW. Upon 
publishing a block with a hash smaller than the target value, one proves that they have 
done sufficient guessing work to satisfy the network at a certain point in time [16]. 
2.4 Proof of Work  
A proof of work (PoW) is a piece of data that is expensive and time-consuming to 
generate but at the same time it is easy for others to verify whether it satisfies predefined 
requirements. Producing a PoW is normally a random event that has low probability. As a 
result, a great deal of trial and error will be needed to produce a valid PoW. Bitcoin uses 
the Hashcash PoW system. In order for a block to be admitted by the network, the miners 
need to first perform a PoW that encompasses the entire data of the block. 
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The difficulty of this job can be adjusted in order to restrict the rate at which new blocks 
can be generated by the network. Because of the small likelihood of successful 
generation, it is rather impossible to foresee which miner gets to first produce the next 
block. In order for a block to be valid, the puzzle requires the new hash to be smaller than 
a predefined number. This infers that for generating each block some work has been 
performed. Each block contains the hash of the upcoming block, hence each block 
possesses a chain of blocks which contain a large extent of work. As a result, modifying a 
block necessitates regeneration of all descendants and reperforming the work they 
comprehend. This is the main mechanism that protects the blockchain from being 
tampered. One of the most widely used proof-of-work schemes is based on SHA-2 which 
will be explained in the following.  
The blockchain is to a large extent reproduced at each contributing node. In this 
context, the system is comprised of two different node types: regular nodes and miners. 
Regular nodes are those who directly involve in the transactions and can place at either 
end of a bargain, while miners are those who will receive incentives in return for 
evaluation of the submitted transactions. 
Each user of the blockchain generates a public and private key in which each pair 
is 256 bit long. Private keys are used by the regular nodes to sign their transactions. A 
bitcoin user is identified by the 160-bit long hash of their public key encoded using 
Base58Check. When a set of transactions are grouped together, they are located into a 
block that can be added to the ledger. In order for a miner to add a new block to the 
ledger, they have to solve a computationally difficult and therefore expensive problem. 
The SHA2 secure hash function can for instance be used to hash several pieces of 
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information, including the transactions, the hash of the previous block, and a nonce (i.e., 
a random number that is only used once), as shown in Figure 2.5. 
 
Figure 2-5. The structure of blockchain blocks.
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CHAPTER III  
FROM BLOCKCHAIN TO INTERNET-BASED VOTING 
In this chapter, we outline the requirements for a blockchain-based voting system 
and highlight the key differences with existing blockchain platforms, while proposing 
new ideas on how such differences can be confronted. Furthermore, we identify the gaps 
between the proposed solutions and the architecture needed to enable Internet-based 
voting based on the blockchain technology. More specifically, we introduce a mechanism 
to authenticate votes based on live biometric characteristics. Additionally, we discuss 
how the scalability issues can be tackled by enabling parallel blockchains at the precinct-
level as well as a hierarchical structure for the vote counting.  
3.1 Related Work 
In principal, blockchains are conceived to be extremely difficult to compromise. 
There is therefore no exception to a potential blockchain-based voting system. Even 
though one could try altering some of the ballots in a new block, it could be easily 
conquered as long as the majority of the miners in the network are honest. This way the 
new blocks can be consistently generated in a truthful fashion while the faulty blocks will 
find their ways out the window. To enhance the likelihood of broadcasting every single 
block to the majority of the miners in Bitcoin blockchain, it is typical for a miner to wait 
21 
 
and not confirm the blocks until six new blocks are fully generated [17]. This implies that 
every miner should normally have five unconfirmed blocks in their database. That is 
exactly why there is one hour latency in confirmation of newly generated blocks. Based 
on this scheme, however, the new blocks would be always vulnerable to attacks until they 
are confirmed. Once the confirmation goes through, it would be virtually impossible to 
attack a block simply because a hacker would have to now solve a much more difficult 
math problem, i.e. to find a nonce with an altered ballot that would lead to exactly the 
same hash as before. That is why blockchains are referred to as unforgeable public 
ledgers. 
What follows is the big picture of what we propose for our blockchain based e-
voting system, which is well in line with that of the existing digital currencies such as 
Bitcoin: 
a. When new ballots are submitted they are broadcasted to all nodes across the 
network. 
b. Upon receiving several new ballots, each node tries collecting them into a block. 
c. Each node then works on finding a difficult-to-solve proof-of-work protocol for 
its block. 
d. When a proof-of-work protocol is found, the block is broadcasted to all the nodes. 
e. Each node then accepts the block only if all the ballots within it are valid and not 
previously used elsewhere. 
f. Nodes display their approval of the block by trying to create the subsequent or 
following block in the chain, while using the hash of the accepted block as the 
preceding hash. 
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g. It is a common practice for the nodes to consider the longest chain to be the 
correct one and therefore upcoming blocks will be added in a way to extend it.  
Unlike the digital currencies, in which every user, regardless of their geographical 
location, can take part in transactional activities, voting requires that only legal citizens of 
a particular nation can vote. This creates a huge difference in the infrastructure of the 
ledger. Hence, a blockchain in its typical form is far from sufficient from being used as 
the Internet-based voting. This requirement for voting necessitates the involvement of the 
government in the process. The government will ensure to put in place extra and 
exclusive measures to prevent potential frauds. In this context, a separate system must be 
devised to verify the citizenship and residency status of all the voters before they can be 
registered in the system. How to set up such a system is beyond the scope of this work. 
Nevertheless, any developed democratic country is expected to have already had a robust 
system for voters registration. Even with a robust voters registration system, the 
internet-based voting would still have to overcome the challenge of authenticating voters 
remotely. This in principle has nothing to do with the blockchain nature of the platform. 
Several studies have been already conducted by the blockchain industries who have 
investigated the use of the blockchain technology for internet-based voting [18], [19], 
[20]. They all concluded that the security risks at the current moment are greater than the 
benefits of it citing primarily the concerns on the difficulty of remote authentication of 
voters. While this may be a valid statement necessitating further studies on the topic, it is 
imperative to study the security and performance aspects of the blockchain e-voting in a 
quantitative manner as well. For the first time, herein we will take on this very important 
aspect of the technology. 
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Several research groups across the globe have reported works on electronic voting 
systems based on blockchain [21], [22], [23], [24]. Such researches mostly focus on the 
conceptual aspects of it and the need for protecting the privacy of the voters, i.e., how the 
votes can be kept anonymous in the records in the blockchain blocks. In [22], for 
instance, a trusted third party is proposed to be delegated by the voter registration agency 
to authenticate each voter based on the hash of the secret message that is exclusively 
issued for that voter by the agency. The delegation of duties between the voters 
registration organization and the trusted third party for verification of the entities is 
reported to ensure some level of privacy. It is also proposed to devote one distributed 
ledger for each candidate or party. Based on such approach, the winning candidate or 
party should be determined based upon the ledger with the longest chain. Other than the 
fact that this may damage the vote secrecy, we will see later in this chapter why this is 
not a viable option. To deal with the scalability constraint of blockchains, researchers in 
[24] discuss an algorithm that is proposed based on boardroom voting. A 
Diffie-Hellman-based algorithm is also utilized to protect the privacy of the voters. Being 
limited to the boardroom election, in such system every eligible voter must vote in order 
for the algorithm to work. This is not clearly applicable for general public elections. A 
real deployment of blockchain voting for general public elections, however, has been 
recently conducted by a start-up company called Votem [25]. One of the case studies of 
Votem is related to 2016 general election in the State of Montana in which Votem's 
Electronic Absentee System (EAS) and the Electronic Ballot Request System (EBRS) 
was implemented to facilitate absentee ballot delivery serving military and overseas 
voters in compliance with the Federal Voting Assistance Program and electors with 
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disabilities in compliance with Americans with Disabilities Act. Votem enables end-to-
end verification of the election happens in a rolling and ongoing fashion during the 
election process. It benefits the exclusive Proof of Vote® Protocol for its end-to-end 
voter verifiable digital voting system. Despite, Votem has not dealt with the scalability 
issue of the blockchain voting system at large. 
3.2 Remote Voter Authentication 
We believe that the current technology is mature enough to ensure highly secure 
and reliable voter authentication. Hence, the need for remote voter authentication cannot 
be used as a reasonable excuse for not implementing Internet-based voting. While photo 
IDs are not required for (traditional) voting in the US, the concerns for security risks of 
remote voter authentication are automatically blown out of proportion [18], [19], [20]. 
Here, we propose recording the biometric information of every eligible voter at the time 
of registration. This may include but is not limited to fingerprint, IRIS, and facial 
characteristics. Such biometric data must be updated periodically prior to each election to 
ensure each eligible voter is still alive and thereby eliminating the prospect of someone 
impersonating a dead person. When remotely authenticating the voters, a voter should be 
also asked to submit the recorded biometric information to the system (e.g. via a smart 
phone app or full desktop computer application with a webcam). Designated centers may 
also be considered for people who have access to neither of the above-mentioned options. 
The camera in the machine can even monitor eye blinking, and possibly monitor body 
temperatures to ensure an actual live person is authenticating the voting system. Upon 
implementation of such measures, it would be impossible for a hacker to impersonate 
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another eligible voter. The nationwide biometrics database would also eliminate the 
possibility for anyone to vote multiple times while impersonating as different individuals. 
3.3 Vote Secrecy 
Vote secrecy implies that the no one can find out whom a voter has voted for. So 
long as it is desired to ensure that only eligible voters can vote, absolute vote secrecy 
cannot be achieved. This is because at some point in the voting process it is inevitable to 
rely on a centralized voter registration organization who is in charge of registering and 
authenticating voters. Such organization should be naturally trusted by the general public 
however and therefore it has the means to trace back the origins of each vote. Similar to 
[22], here it is assumed that a pseudo-identifier can be created for each voter at the time 
of authentication in order for them to cast their ballots. More specifically, the voter would 
use a key generator to produce a pair of public and private keys. The public key would be 
utilized as the voter ID, while the private key is used to cast the ballot. The voter ID is 
temporarily linked to the voter portfolio in the ongoing election. This voter ID should be 
different for different elections to maximize the vote secrecy. The above-mentioned 
technique would be fully compatible with the requirement of blockchain systems, in 
which the user’s public key is used as the user identifier. 
3.4 Voting Transparency and Consequences 
One of the key and unique features of the blockchain is that it allows anyone to 
validate the transactions submitted throughout the system. While this feature can help 
build up the voting transparency, it can at the same time negatively influence the natural 
flow of an election. In effect, the outcome of the blockchain mining is in real-time 
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disclosed to the entire network, while the election is still ongoing. As a result, if certain 
groups of people find out that their candidates have fallen significantly short in votes, 
they might relinquish and choose not to take part in the election at all. Although this is 
not a fatal gating factor, in order to resolve this issue, it is proposed here to keep the vote 
counts secret until the conclusion of the election. This is however contradictory to the 
notion of using separate ledgers for each candidate in which the length of the chain would 
automatically reveal the winning party. To address this concern, a single blockchain can 
be used for an entire election. Even though this approach can cause scalability concerns, 
it would be described at a later stage how it can be addressed.  
Similar to Bitcoin, in which blocks are comprised of several transactions, every 
block would contain a set of ballots in blockchain-based e-voting. In elections in which 
several candidates can be voted for by each voter, each ballot can very well contain 
multiple choices. This could even occur at various levels (e.g. national, state, or local). In 
such scenario, the ballots should be encrypted using symmetric keys of the voters. Such 
encryption can be performed in a fashion similar to that of the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 
technique, as shown in Fig. 3.1. In effect, the voter could encrypt his/her key using the 
public key provided by the election organization. PGP that was introduced in 1991 [26], 
is an encryption program providing cryptographic privacy and authentication for data 
communication. PGP has been widely used for signing, encrypting, and decrypting texts, 
e-mails, files, directories, and whole disk partitions as well as for increasing the security 
of e-mail communications. This way the general public can only get to find out the 
number of votes that have been cast, while the winning party is fully disguised until the 
election is entirely concluded. In such manner, the votes are also further protected by 
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encryption and only the election organization can decrypt the ballots. Once the election is 
ended, the election organization would make the encryption keys public so that anyone 
could verify the ballots. Simple programs can then be employed to automatically count 
the votes. 
 
Figure 3-1. Illustration of how ballots can be protected by an encryption scheme 
similar to that of PGP. 
3.5 Overcoming the Blockchain Scalability Limitation 
The blockchain in its current form of implementation has serious scalability issues 
in which there are very limited number of new blocks that can be added to the chain in a 
certain time period. For instance, Bitcoin [27] blockchain only allows for about seven 
transactions per second to go through at the peak throughput [28]. If we assume that each 
block contains information about 10 votes, slightly over 250 thousand votes per hour can 
be added to the blockchain. According to this rate, a national election with 60% 
participation rate in the US would require about 330 hours, or two weeks for casting all 
the votes. This is clearly not feasible when a large scale election is to be conducted using 
the blockchain technology. It is suggested here to address the scalability issue by creating 
a hierarchical structure in the voting infrastructure. This is well in-line with the traditional 
form of elections in the United States in which election units can be as large as a county, 
or as small as a precinct. Such units can be managed by an individual blockchain as 
opposed to using a single blockchain for the entire nation. This scheme, illustrated in Fig. 
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3.2, would naturally enable parallel processing to a large extent which is mandatory for a 
nationwide election.  
 
Figure 3-2. By using multiple region-based blockchains the scalability of the 
e-voting system can be significantly improved. 
3.6 Other Practical Considerations 
Thus far, several practical issues of the Internet-based voting were considered. 
Here, we discuss a number of other potential challenges that need to be addressed when 
implementing a blockchain-based voting system in a real-world scenario. First, despite 
the general wealth in the US, there are still significant number of people who may not 
have personal computers and/or do not have access to the Internet. Therefore, as 
mentioned earlier traditional voting centers that are equipped with Internet-connected 
computers would be still needed to allow any voter to go to such centers for casting their 
ballots. Moreover, to ensure the security and robustness of the blockchain-based voting 
infrastructure, a great number of miners would be required. In the case of Bitcoin or other 
blockchain-based digital currencies, in order to encourage more miners to participate in 
the mining process, certain incentives are considered to those who successfully solve the 
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puzzle. Similar incentives would be also necessary to attract miners for the voting 
infrastructure. After all, it should be kept in mind that voting in any country is an 
expensive activity. It is conceivable to anticipate tax-payer funds to be allocated for 
elections. Such funding can be also used to constantly improve the blockchain-related 
infrastructure and the methodologies that are to be implemented in the upcoming 
elections. Another viable approach for funding the incentivization process is to convince 
all the participating parties of the election to contribute to the expenditures. The amount 
of spending in this process would be actually insignificant as compared to the amount of 
money that is typically spent by the candidates for campaigning and commercials in each 
election.  
Other potential concern when using internet-based election system is the prospect 
of letting foreigners to take part in the process of ballot verification. Such imperfection 
can readily open the door for malicious attacks to take place leading to tampering with 
the election result. In order to address this issue, one potential solution is to use private 
blockchains rather than public blockchains. In private blockchains the participants can be 
easily limited and controlled using traditional methods. A private blockchain can be 
planned such that only certain entities can append data into the blockchain, without 
providing external entities with the read or write access. To enable private blockchains, it 
is typical to use private networks with firewalls and IP whitelisting. Since IPs may be 
easily faked even by the hackers in other parts of the globe, other practical measure 
should be also put in place to further strengthen the security of the process. One good 
example is to consider a registration mechanism for those who are willing to play a role 
as miners. This could be very similar to that of the voters registration mechanism with the 
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added measure that the miners should undergo the intense background check. Obviously, 
only the citizens of that particular nation should be given the ability to register as miners. 
Being a very sensitive process, however, such technique has to be carefully devised in 
order not to compromise for the transparency of the voting ledger.  
3.7 Important Parameters of the Network 
In this section we review and introduce some of the more important parameters 
and performance characteristics of the blockchain that are necessary to consider when 
quantitively evaluating the performance and security aspects of a blockchain platform. 
Majority of these parameters will be used in the next chapter when simulating various 
scenarios of the blockchain voting system. 
 Stale block rate is the rate at which stale blocks are generated. ‘Stale blocks’ 
refer to those blocks that are not included in the longest chain due to, for instance, 
contradiction or concurrency. Stale blocks are unfavorable to the security and 
performance of the blockchain as they initiate unwanted chain forks in the system. 
Chain forks negatively impact the growth of the central chain of the ledger and 
can cause bandwidth complications in the network. But above all, the stale blocks 
increase the ability of the dishonest nodes in performing fraudulent activities such 
as selfish mining, explained in the next chapter. 
 Block interval is one of the most important parameters of the blockchain systems 
and is determined by the delay at which data is amended onto the ledger. A 
smaller block interval suggests a faster ballot approval and a higher likelihood of 
generating “stale blocks”. It should be noted that adjusting the block interval 
implies changing the difficulty level of the to be solved PoW problem. In other 
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words, the difficulty of the PoW problem is conversely correlated to the rate at 
which stale blocks can be generated. This in turn infers that adjusting the 
difficulty of the problem can directly impacts the capability of the dishonest nodes 
in attacking the network through tampering with the longest chain of the ledger. 
 Block size determines the number of ballots that can be collected within each 
block. Accordingly, the maximum block size regulates the throughput of the 
blockchain voting system. Larger the size of the block is, the slower the 
propagation speed and higher the slate block rate will be. Therefore, if one is to 
improve the throughput of the system, reducing the security of the system will be 
inevitable.  
 Information propagation mechanism is the mechanism by which the blocks are 
broadcast to various network nodes. The broadcast scheme that is determined by 
the block request management system directly influences the scalability and 
robustness of the ledger. Most widely used propagation scheme is 
advertisement-based management system. In such method, as soon as node I 
receives data from another node, it will advertise the hash of that block to other 
connections in the network. In case one of the nodes has not already received that 
particular data, it will request for the content of it.  
 Mining power is the ratio of the power of the dishonest portion of the network to 
that of the entire network. 
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3.8 Security Issues of Blockchain Voting System 
Three typical ways of attacking a blockchain network are (i) double-spending, (ii) 
selfish mining, and (iii) eclipse attack. In the following we describe each of the 
above-mentioned mechanisms.  
Double-spending is constituted the most common type of committing scams in 
blockchains. For digital currencies, double-spending is referred to the case where a 
certain number of coins are spent in more than one transaction. In case of a blockchain 
voting system, this may be translated to a ballot that is being used for voting more than 
once. But as we will see in the following, due to the fundamental nature of blockchain 
systems, double-spending cannot be considered as a major and rational way of tampering 
with the election results. Let’s first discuss the three different ways that can be used to 
conduct a double-spending activity in the case of Bitcoin and other digital currencies: 
 When two contradictory transactions are submitted to the network in quick 
succession, a race attack is occurred. Obviously, only one of them that involves in 
the longest chain will eventually go through. 
 When one transaction is pre-mined into a new block but it is not released until the 
very same coins are used for another new transaction. This method that is called 
Finney attack results in invalidation of the first transaction, if successful.   
 When more than 51% of the overall computing power in the network is devoted 
for undoing a transaction and instead putting through a preferred transaction, the 
activity is called 51% attack. 
It is important to note that in each of the above fraudulent activities, the person 
who originally submits a transaction is the beneficiary and therefore the actual fraudster. 
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Having no money involved in the transactions (ballot), a potential dishonest voter would 
not gain anything by trying to undo his/her initial ballot. Moreover, such activities 
correspond to the cases in which certain assets, e.g. digital coins, are to be spent for 
contradictory outcomes which is conceptually different than the wills of a potential 
dishonest voter in blockchain voting. Therefore, double-spending seems to be 
fundamentally infeasible to accomplish and is of a lower concern in blockchain-based 
e-voting. 
Selfish mining occurs when a team of dishonest miners collude to augment their 
mining reward revenue. In such scenario miners can potentially earn more reward by 
concealing the newly produced blocks from the core chain and creating a distinct fork. In 
order to better understand selfish mining, let’s take a deeper look into Bitcoin 
blockchains. Bitcoin mining operates based on a group of miners who unravel 
cryptographically complicated problems and get incentivized, i.e. receive digital coins, in 
exchange. Such income depends on a number of factors such as the level of difficulty of 
the cryptographical problem, mining cost, internet speed, and connection quality. All in 
all, Bitcoin is arranged in a way to incentivize miners proportional to their mining output. 
With such strategy in place, even if big groups of miners attempt colluding, they cannot 
receive more coins combined than what they individually and collectively generated in 
the public ledger. Nonetheless, if dishonest nodes conceal the new blocks and make them 
available only in their private network they can rise their share of the network’s overall 
reward. Selfish mining is such an important issue that can even jeopardize the 
decentralization nature of blockchains causing the centralization of the blockchain 
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operations. Unlike double-spending, selfish mining should be carefully treated when it 
comes to blockchain-enabled voting. 
Selfish-mining attacks could have profound effects on the integrity of blockchain 
system. When successful, dishonest adversaries can easily turn into more profitable nodes 
than the honest nodes. Profits from selfish mining can rise if more computational power 
is utilized by the adversaries. This can make the attacks exponentially more effective, 
until to a point where over 50% of the power in the network is held in favor of the 
attackers. This can ultimately force regular nodes out of the network. In such case, the 
dishonest portion of the network would be not only able to gather all the block rewards, 
but also to block any ballot from being counted fairly [29]. 
 
Eclipse attack is another deceitful activity in blockchains in which a dishonest 
node takes control of the victim’s inward and outward connections, hence separating the 
victim from the rest of the nodes in the network. The invader can then block the victim’s 
visibility of the network, and obligate them to spend their computing power on viewing 
an outdated version of the blockchain network, or even worse divert the power to the 
advantage of his/her own iniquitous activities. Other than interrupting and damaging the 
integrity of the blockchain network, eclipse attacks could be the onset of and escalate 
other potential attacks such as selfish mining.
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CHAPTER IV  
SIMULATIONS: PERFORMANCE VS SECURITY 
In this chapter, we leverage a blockchain simulator developed by researchers at 
ETH to study the main gating factors of blockchain-based voting systems that is the 
scalability and throughput of the ledgers. Due to the trade-off between the throughput and 
security of blockchain systems, it is also imperative to study the security concerns of 
blockchain voting systems. Stale blocks are known to pose serious danger to the integrity 
and security of distributed ledgers. Accordingly, we use block interval and block size as 
the inputs of the blockchain simulator to determine the stale block rate in the system. 
Interestingly, block interval and block size are also key parameters when it comes to 
calculation of the system throughput. Finally, the output of the simulator is fed into a 
security model that is developed based on the Markov Decision Processes (MDP) in 
order to investigate the security implications of the blockchain [13].  
4.1 Blockchain Simulator  
Since real-world implementation with thousands of nodes is extremely 
challenging in many cases, a powerful simulator can be of vital importance for 
realistically studying the blockchain performance as a function of network parameters. 
Recent studies on blockchain systems suggest that there is a trade-off between the 
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performance and security of PoW-based blockchains. Therefore, it is extremely helpful to 
have a unified framework that can capture such trade-offs as a function of different 
network parameters. The novel quantitative framework introduced in [13] can analyze the 
security and performance implications of various parameters of PoW blockchains. Taking 
advantage of such framework, not only the security properties of well-known PoW 
platforms such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Litecoin can be examined, but also important 
blockchain parameters can be adjusted to branch out into other similar platform such as 
blockchain-based voting. This framework is comprised of two main elements, a 
blockchain instance and a blockchain security model. A blockchain instance is a proof of 
work blockchain that is represented by a certain set of network parameters, such as block 
generation time, block size, network delays, etc. To convincingly analyze any blockchain 
instance, a simulator can be used to replicate the blockchain network and consensus 
layers through the implementation of advertisement-based data transmission. One of the 
key outputs of a blockchain platform is the rate at which the stale blocks are generated. 
This output can then be used as the input into another model that can give insight to the 
security behavior of the system. Herein, a security model that is built upon Markov 
Decision Processes (MDP) [29] is used to simulate the effect of stale block rates and 
eclipse attacks on selfish mining activities allowing to understand the optimal strategies 
that may be employed by dishonest adversaries. The security of the system can be 
regarded as the genesis of any blockchain platform directly determining any go or no-go 
decision. On the other hand, improving the performance of blockchains is greatly 
valuable as there are ongoing discussions in the community as to how the scalability 
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issues of blockchains can be mitigated through maximizing the block size. Please refer to 
Appendix I for the instruction on the installation of the simulator. 
4.1.1 Simulator Structure 
The list of some of the important blockchain parameters that can be capture by the 
ETH simulator are summarized in Table 4.1. 
Table 4-1. The important network parameters that can be captured in the 
blockchain simulator used in this work. 
Network Parameter Description 
Block Size Fixed block size (bytes) 
Number of Blocks The number of generated blocks 
Number of Nodes The total number of nodes in the network 
Block Interval The average block generation interval (minutes) 
PoW Power Distribution Mining Power Distribution of the Miners 
Number of Connections Per Node Within the Network 
Block Request Management System Protocol Used to Manage Block Requests 
Stale Block Rate The Ratio of the Stale Blocks to the Entire Blocks 
In the simulator, assigning a new block to a miner is determined based upon the 
block interval. In compliance with the existing proof of work blockchains, the simulator 
assumes that typical miners start mining as soon as they receive a block. Also it is 
assumed that potential forks get automatically resolved based on the longest chain rule. 
After resolving any fork, the blocks that are not attributed to the main chain of the 
network are constituted as stale blocks. Since the difficulty variations between various 
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blocks are not considered in the simulator, the lengths of the chains are just defined and 
calculated based on the number of blocks forming each chain. 
In the communication protocol between the nodes, the channels are formed 
directly in between every pair of nodes. This way any intermediary machine such as 
routes are sidestepped completely. Each channel, in this context, would have two main 
features, bandwidth and latency. In order to credibly take the effect of network latencies 
in the simulator, the developers have employed the global IP latency statistics from 
Verizon. Furthermore, in order to accurately capture the bandwidth of the network, 
testmy.net has been utilized to obtain the bandwidth distributions. However, since the 
main intent of the simulator is to investigate the effect of the network parameters such as 
the block size and the block interval, it does not capture transaction propagation which 
has no correlation with the above-mentioned parameters. 
The simulator differentiates miners from the typical nodes of the network. The 
geographical node distribution of the network is extracted from blockchain.info. Based 
on this distribution, around 52% of the nodes are located in Europe while North America 
contributes about 39% of the nodes. The remaining nodes in percentile order are traced to 
be in Asia Pacific, Australia, Japan, and South America. On the other hand, the 
distribution of the miners is quite different. Asia pacific possesses a share of about 71%, 
while North America and Europe only contribute about 24% and 5%, respectively [13]. It 
should be noted that such distribution which is correlated to the Bitcoin blockchain is 
merely utilized to replicate a real-world implementation. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, ideally only miners who live in certain geographical areas and are citizens of a 
particular country should be authenticated to play a role in voting blockchain system, 
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either as miners or regular nodes (voters). Despite, the real case geographical distribution 
employed in the simulator is not going to have a substantial impact on the performance of 
the network. 
4.2 Simulations 
In this section we first describe the conditions under which the simulation are 
conducted. Then, the simulations results are presented and discussed. It is noteworthy to 
mention that the simulator used here has been previously validated through comparison 
with empirical results of several blockchain platforms such as Bitcoin and Litecoin. The 
key idea here is to alter the network parameters of interest, such as block interval and 
block size, to measure other important parameters such as the stale block rates and look 
into the security aspects of the ledger as a function of those parameters. Finally, a set of 
parameter values that can result in the best-case performance and security in the network 
will be proposed in the upcoming sections. 
4.2.1 Simulation Conditions 
The simulations are conducted based on the assumption that the dishonest nodes 
cannot potentially utilize more than 30% of the overall mining power [30]. We perform 
the simulations for block sizes ranging from 1 KB up to 25 MB, given different block 
intervals ranged between 1 seconds and 30 minutes. The number of generated blocks and 
the total number of nodes in the network are both considered to be 100 in all the 
simulations. Based on such combination, each simulation run takes about 70 seconds to 
complete which is orders of magnitude faster than an actual implementation if we were to 
really execute the scenario in real-world. As a reference, it should be mentioned that 
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simulation runs with the number of blocks/nodes of 500/100, and 100/500 would take 
about 300 seconds and 900 seconds to finish, respectively. A 500/500 combination for 
number of blocks/nodes also requires longer than an hour to finish for every run. On the 
other hand, the simulations suggest that they all result in comparable outcome, stale block 
rate, to that of 100/100 combination (see Fig. 4.1). Since we are to perform over 50 runs, 
the latter is used to save considerable amount of time. 
 
Figure 4-1. Stale block rate as a function of block interval for a block size of 
10 KB and for different combinations for the number of blocks and nodes. 
4.2.2 Simulation Results 
Simulations were performed for six different block sizes 1 KB, 10 KB, 100 KB, 
1 MB, 10 MB, and 25 MB, while measuring the stale block rate for each of the following 
block intervals 1, 10, 30, 60, 300, 600, 1200, and 1800 seconds. This accounts for 48 
individual scenarios whose results are shown in Fig. 4.2. By conducting these simulations 
we aim at studying the impact of block interval and block size on the stale block rate. 
Stale block rate is very pivotal to determining the security of the blockchain network, as 
it will be discussed in the upcoming sections. For now, it is enough to know that a 
smaller stale block rate is more desired and typically represents a more secure system.  
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As a general trend, the simulation results of Fig. 4.2 suggest that the stale block 
rate is inversely correlated with the block interval. Moreover, at a constant block interval 
larger block size results in a higher value of stale block rate. Accordingly, it is safe to 
conclude that increasing the block interval and block size will improve and degrade the 
security, respectively. 
4.3 Security Model 
In order to investigate the security of voting blockchain system, the security 
model [13] developed based on Markov Decision Processes (MDP) is used here. In this 
model, the output of the blockchain simulator, i.e. the stale block rate, obtained in the 
previous section can be used as the input of the MDP model to find the potential relative 
revenue of the dishonest network for each scenario. The revenue of the dishonest network 
measured in percentage relative to the total revenue in the network is a key measure of 
the security of blockchain systems. As discussed in chapter 3, two of the most typical 
malicious activities that can be performed on a blockchain e-voting are selfish mining 
and eclipse attacks that are the point of focus in this section. 
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Figure 4-2. Stale block rate as a function of block interval for various block sizes: 
1 KB, 10 KB, 100 KB, 1 MB, 10 MB, and 25 MB.  
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4.3.1 Selfish Mining  
Based on the standard protocol of blockchains, as soon as a block is found by any 
nodes, it should be instantly reported to the entire network by the nodes. However, it has 
been shown that a potential dishonest node can selfishly enhance his/her revenue by 
deliberately withholding some of the blocks. Understanding such optimal strategies can 
be used as the means for comparing the security and performance requirements of proof 
of work blockchains as a function of network parameters. As stated earlier, the goal of 
the adversaries in selfish mining is not to optimize the overall reward amount, but to 
enhance the ratio of the adversarial blocks that are accepted to all the blocks in main 
chain of the network. This malicious activity that can be potentially taken advantage of 
for tampering with the election results can be modeled by optimizing the relative revenue 
rev defined in equation (1): 
ݎ݁ݒ ൌ lim୬→ஶ
∑ ௥೏ೕ೙ೕసభ
∑ ሺ௥೓ೕା௥೏ೕሻ೙ೕసభ
	                          
(1) 
where ݎ௛ೕ and ݎௗೕ are the rewards of the honest and dishonest nodes, respectively, in step 
j. The fact that the objective of dishonest miners in selfish mining is to improve their 
relative share of the entire reward pool implies that the reward function is not linear, and 
therefore the problem cannot be simply modeled via typical MDP technique. Instead, the 
problem should be converted into a family of MDPs, described in [13, 29]. The model 
used here follows the above-mentioned selfish mining strategy indirectly capturing 
different network parameters such as block size and block interval. It should be noted that 
the mining costs will not be considered in this model because the objective of the selfish 
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mining MDP is to enhance the relative mining share rather than the monetary reward. 
Figure 4.3 shows the relative mining share of the dishonest network as a function of the 
stale block rate for two different mining powers of 0.1 and 0.3. This implies that no 
adversary with a mining power of 0.3, for instance, can harvest more than 30% of the 
total mining power in the network. Therefore, by using this condition we can ensure to 
consider the worst case scenario for a malicious activity. In order to stay below a relative 
mining share of 0.5 in the case of the worst case scenario (mining power of 0.3), we need 
to ensure not to surpass a stale block rate of ~30%. 
 
Figure 4-3. Relative mining share of the dishonest nodes as a function of the stale 
block rate in the network, for mining powers of 0.1 and 0.3 [13]. 
4.3.2 Eclipse Attacks 
The MDP model can also take into account the effect of the eclipse attacks in 
escalating the selfish mining activities. The model assumes that the honest miners are 
influenced by the stale block rate, while the dishonest portion of the nodes dodge stale 
blocks and do not mine them. Even though the dishonest nodes are capable of utilizing 
any mined blocks for their malicious activities, they can easily dodge stale blocks once 
they go after an honest chain. Practically so, they possess a significantly lower possibility 
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of mining the stale blocks than the honest portion of the network. The honest nodes get 
constantly exposed to validation and propagation latencies and naturally they encounter a 
greater number of stale blocks. Figure 4.4 is the color map of relative mining share 
showing the impact of eclipse attacks on selfish mining. The graph actually represents the 
case where the dishonest network misuses the mining power of the honest nodes ߱ in 
order to grow their private chain. 
 
Figure 4-4. The color map of relative mining share (revenue) as a function of 
adversarial mining power and eclipsed mining power [13]. 
The graph of Fig. 4.4 can be interpreted in two ways: (i) when the eclipsed mining 
power increases, the maximum tolerable adversarial mining power reduces in order to 
stay below a relative mining share of 50%. (ii) It is also inferred that at a specific 
adversarial mining power, a more serious eclipse attack, i.e. higher value of ߱, improves 
the success rate of the dishonest network in their malicious activities. In other words, a 
higher eclipse mining power at a particular adversarial mining power results in a higher 
relative revenue or relative mining share. As a result, when the dishonest network is 
equipped with eclipse attack a stale block of 30% cannot be tolerated anymore. In order 
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to also take the effect of eclipse attacks into account we consider a more conservative 
stale block rate of 10% in our analysis. 
 
Figure 4-5. The color map of stale block rate as a function of block size and block 
interval. 
In order to consolidate the simulation results of Fig. 4.2, the color map of Fig. 4.5 
is generated to provide a more intuitive understanding of various scenarios tested here. 
Based on this graph, we can easily visualize the allowable combination of block size and 
block interval values in order to stay within the stale block rate of 10% and lower. 
4.4 Scalability 
In order to investigate the scalability of the blockchain network, we use the notion 
of throughput defined here as the number of ballots per seconds (bps). To calculate the 
throughput of the blockchain voting system we should assume a realistic value for the 
ballot size. Since the size of each virtual transaction is largely determined by the size of 
the hash and headers, it should be very comparable to that of a potential virtual ballot. In 
the case of digital currencies, each transaction input requires at least 41 bytes for the 
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previous transaction reference and other headers while each transaction output requires 
an additional 9 bytes of headers. Finally, every transaction has a header at least 
10 bytes long. Therefore, we estimate the average size of each ballot to be around 100 
bytes. The throughput of the voting blockchain for a voting period of 12 hours can be 
calculated using: 
ܰ ൌ ቀௌ஻ቁ ൈ 12 ൈ 60 ൈ ቀ
଺଴
௧ ቁ                     (2) 
where S, B, and t are block size in bytes, ballot size in bytes, and block interval in 
seconds, respectively. Institutively, a higher throughput requires a higher block size and 
lower block interval. In practice, pushing the limits on the two parameters is not desired 
as it may jeopardize the security of the ledger. This is because of the higher stale block 
rate and therefore higher relative revenue (mining share) dishonest nodes can potentially 
achieve via selfish mining and eclipse attacks. Using equation (2), the throughput of the 
blockchain voting system for various scenarios of Fig. 4.2 and Fig. 4.5 is calculated and 
listed in Table 4.2. In this table, the green entries denote allowable stale block rate (10% 
and below), while the orange entries, correlated to stale block rates of above 10%, 
represent the block size and interval combinations that pose a danger to the security of 
the network. 
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Table 4-2. Throughput of the blockchain voting system for different 
combinations of block interval and block size. 
Block 
Interval 
(Sec) 
Block Size 
1 KB  10 KB  100 KB  1 MB  10 MB  25 MB 
1  432,000  4,320,000 43,200,000 432,000,000 4,320,000,000  10,800,000,000
10  43,200  432,000  4,320,000  43,200,000  432,000,000  1,080,000,000
30  14,400  144,000  1,440,000  14,400,000  144,000,000  360,000,000 
60  7,200  72,000  720,000  7,200,000  72,000,000  180,000,000 
300  1,440  14,400  144,000  1,440,000  14,400,000  36,000,000 
600  720  7,200  72,000  720,000  7,200,000  18,000,000 
1200  360  3,600  36,000  360,000  3,600,000  9,000,000 
1800  240  2,400  24,000  240,000  2,400,000  6,000,000 
 
It can be observed from the table that a block interval of 10 minutes and block 
size of 25 MB result in the highest throughput of 18 Millions without compromising the 
security of the system. Therefore, we introduce the above mentioned combination as the 
optimum parameters of the network for a blockchain voting application. 
Now, let’s see if such conditions is feasible for the magnitude of US presidential 
election. Even though, the number of eligible voters in the US is estimated to be around 
250 Millions, in chapter 3 we proposed using precinct-based blockchains in order to 
address the scalability of blockchain voting. As a result, if we are to assign an individual 
blockchain to each state, we should decide the feasibility based the most populous state. 
Historically, California is considered to have the highest population in the United States 
with the number of eligible voters to be 18.2 Millions. Considering the fact that the 
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participation rate in the US presidential election is around 60%, the throughput of 18 M 
obtained with the block size and block interval of 25 MB and 10 minutes, respectively, 
well satisfies the demands from a blockchain-based voting platform. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this work, we examined the challenges of using the blockchain technology for 
building an Internet-based voting system. Several studies have previously argued that the 
challenges associated with Internet-based voting are too risky to allow a successful 
implementation. Here, we provide the reasoning and methodologies on how different 
concerns such as authentication, privacy, transparency, and scalability can be addressed. 
As for scalability, for instance, which is known to be one of the most gating technical 
aspects of blockchain-based voting, we introduced a way to mitigate the issue via parallel 
processing of blockchains based on geographical zones such as states. 
Unlike the previous works that only focus on qualitative discussions of 
blockchain voting and the potential risks associated with it, here for the first time we take 
on a quantitative study of such platform to understand the performance and security 
implications of it. To achieve this objective, we took advantage of the blockchain 
simulator developed at ETH Zurich along with Markov Decision Processes (MDP) model 
reported in the literature. The simulator along with MDP model enabled us to capture the 
interaction effects between the performance characteristics of the network, e.g. 
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throughput, block interval and block size, and the security measures of it such as stale 
block rate and relative mining share of adversarial nodes. Finally, we considered selfish 
mining and eclipse attacks as the most effective malicious activities that can be done by 
potential fraudsters, and obtained the optimal and yet very safe block size and block 
interval of 25 MB and 300 seconds, respectively, resulting in the highest throughput of 18 
millions in a 12 hour voting period. Such large throughput along with the parallel 
processing scheme proposed here very well alleviate the concerns on the scalability of 
blockchain technology for voting applications. 
In this work, the standard block propagation mechanism was utilized throughout 
the simulations. However, as it is perceived in the literature, the block propagation 
mechanism can significantly impact the security of the blockchain, since it directly 
affects the stale block rate. Future works include studying the effect of various block 
propagation mechanisms and developing an optimal mechanism that can minimize the 
stale block rate for a similar condition and therefore improve the security of the network. 
This may also be used indirectly as the weapon to increase the throughput of the 
blockchain e-voting. 
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APPENDIX 
SIMULATOR INSTALLATION GUIDE 
This simulator should be installed in the “Terminal” environment of Ubuntu. 
One rather simple way to install Ubuntu on a Windows personal computer is to 
use Oracle VM VirtualBox Manager. Once the Ubuntu is installed on the virtual 
machine, the following steps will be performed in Terminal: 
1- First git should be installed using the following command: 
sudo apt-get install git -y 
 
2- The Simulator should be first cloned using the following command: 
git clone https://github.com/arthurgervais/Bitcoin-
Simulator 
 
3- The Simulator is built on ns3. It properly works with versions 3.25 that can 
be found from the official website: https://www.nsnam.org/ns-3-25/  
ns3 should be installed in a new directory as follows: 
mkdir workspace 
cd workspace/ 
wget https://www.nsnam.org/release/ns-allinone-3.25.tar.bz2 
The minimal set of packages that are needed to run ns-3 can be installed 
using: 
sudo apt-get install gcc g++ python 
We also need to install open MPI library in order to enable MPI-based 
simulations and make them more scalable: 
sudo apt-get install openmpi-bin openmpi-common openmpi-doc 
libopenmpi-dev 
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4- Untar it with the following command: 
tar xvfj ns-allinone-3.25.tar.bz2 
 
5- For exchanging block messages, rapidjson should be downloaded to the 
home directory: 
cd 
git clone https://github.com/Tencent/rapidjson 
 
6- In this step we need to copy all the files from the simulator and rapidjson to 
ns3. In order to do so, we first create a new directory named rapidjson 
under ns-allinone-3.25/ns-3.25. Then we copy the contents of the original 
rapidjson directory (from the downloaded rapidjson project in step 4) to the 
newly created rapidjson folder (ns-allinone-3.25/ns-3.25/rapidjson). Then 
all the files from Bitcoin-Simulation should be copied into the respective 
folders under ns-allinone-3.xx/ns-3.xx/. 
 
7- Update the following script file ns-allinone-3.25/ns-
3.25/src/applications/wscript 
 By adding the following lines in module.source: 
'model/bitcoin.cc', 
'model/bitcoin-node.cc', 
'model/bitcoin-miner.cc', 
'model/bitcoin-simple-attacker.cc', 
'model/bitcoin-selfish-miner.cc', 
'model/bitcoin-selfish-miner-trials.cc', 
'helper/bitcoin-topology-helper.cc', 
'helper/bitcoin-node-helper.cc', 
'helper/bitcoin-miner-helper.cc',    
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 And by adding the following lines in headers.source: 
'model/bitcoin.h', 
'model/bitcoin-node.h', 
'model/bitcoin-miner.h', 
'model/bitcoin-simple-attacker.h', 
'model/bitcoin-selfish-miner.h', 
'model/bitcoin-selfish-miner-trials.h', 
'helper/bitcoin-topology-helper.h', 
'helper/bitcoin-node-helper.h', 
'helper/bitcoin-miner-helper.h',    
  
 
8- Update the following script file: ns-allinone-3.25/ns-
3.25/src/internet/wscript. 
 By adding the following line in obj.source: 
'helper/ipv4-address-helper-custom.cc', 
 And by adding the following line in the beginning of headers.source 
section: 
'helper/ipv4-address-helper-custom.h', 
 
9- Configure ns3 with the follow command to ensure compatibility and 
maximum performance (it should be executed under the ns-3.25 directory): 
CXXFLAGS="-std=c++11" ./waf configure --build-
profile=optimized --out=build/optimized --with-
pybindgen=/home/bill/Desktop/workspace/ns-allinone-
3.24/pybindgen-0.17.0.post41+ngd10fa60 --enable-mpi --
enable-static 
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10- As the last step, ns3 should be built using the following command under 
ns-3.25 directory: 
./waf  
 
11- Eventually, the simulations can be run using the following sample 
command: 
./waf --run "bitcoin-test --noBlocks=100 --
nodes=6000" 
 
 
